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Would You Choose a Stutterer for President? Looking at Listener Perceptions and Employment Discrimination towards People who Stutter.

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The current study examines the discrimination faced by people who stutter in the workplace. Two hundred four participants were recruited from Introduction to Psychology classes at a small liberal arts college in the Midwest. Participants filled out a survey after listening to audio samples of “potential candidates” who were running for president; one of the samples contained fluent speech and one of the samples contained stuttered speech. The first hypothesis was that if someone who stutters was being chosen for a high-status job, they would receive negative feedback and be less likely picked for the job. The second hypothesis was that the label “stutterer” used to identify a person with a stutter would negatively influence the attitudes and ratings of the listener. The results of the study supported the belief that if someone who stutters was being chosen for a high-status job, they would receive negative feedback and be less likely picked for the job.

Key words: stuttering; speech disorders; listener perceptions; negative judgments, discrimination; workplace

When people with normal speech listened to people with communication disorders, they have a negative reaction toward the person with the disorder (Williams & Dietrich, 1996). In particular, those who stutter were often perceived negatively based on their communication disorder. For example, people who stutter can be viewed as less capable at the workplace based simply on their disorder (Klein & Hood, 2004). If two candidates were running for president where one candidate was slightly better for the job but had a stutter and the other candidate was slightly less qualified but sounded confident, who would you vote for? Most people would probably not pick the candidate with the stutter because his disorder would lead people to make negative judgments about him and his credibility.

People who stutter experience internal negative feelings as well as negative attitudes from their peers. In fact, past research has revealed that even Speech-Language Pathologists can hold negative attitudes towards people who stutter (Crichton-Smith, 2002). According to the article *Attitudes of Speech and Language Therapists towards Stammering: 1985 and 2000*, researchers found that therapists – just two decades ago – held negative attitudes toward those who stuttered. Fortunately, since 1985 (when these negative attitudes were studied), Speech-Language Pathologists have become more positive when dealing with patients who stutter. It is apparent that people who stutter face potential discrimination in many settings, so the daily workplace should not have to be one of them. As Speech-Language Pathologists are becoming more positive towards people who stutter, this could lead to more efficient therapy and better outcomes for dealing with workplace discrimination.

Research is needed in this area so that speech

therapists can better counsel their patients who are in the work force. People at the workplace need to be educated about speech disorders and other disorders and disabilities in the hope of reducing negative attitudes. Research is also needed in finding if the label used to refer to people with a stutter will affect the ratings given by the listener in a negative way. Calling someone a “stutterer” is more negative to hear than if you were to label that person as a “person who stutters.” Depending on the label that someone is given, a person with the stutter may be perceived more negatively.

About Stuttering

Stuttering can be characterized by an abnormally high frequency and/or duration of stoppages in the forward flow of speech (Guitar, 2006). These stoppages usually take the form of (1) repetitions of sounds, syllables, or one-syllable words, (2) prolongations of sounds, or (3) “blocks” of airflow or voicing in speech (Guitar, 2006). When a person stutters, they usually react by trying to force the words out, by using extra sounds, words, or movements (i.e., face or neck tension) in an effort to become “unstuck” or to avoid getting stuck on a word. Many of those who stutter develop secondary behaviors, which are broken down into escape and avoidance behaviors (Guitar, 2006). Escape behaviors are used at the termination of a stutter and are usually shown by eye blinks, head nods, and interjections such as “uh”. Avoidance behaviors are used when the person is anticipating a stutter and tries to avoid the negative experience of the stutter by using the above escape behaviors or changing around what they were going to say.

People who stutter usually experience feelings of frustration, shame, guilt, and fear (Guitar, 2006). As

negative stuttering experiences continue to happen, people who stutter usually develop negative feelings about themselves and feel as though those around them find them stupid and nervous. Past research has found that anxiety is a trait of people who stutter across all severities, especially in social situations (Ezrati-Vinacour & Levin, 2004). As people who stutter are dealing with anxiety and self-consciousness, it is then difficult to have society confirm their thoughts by placing negative stereotypes on them. People with a communication disorder can be viewed as “generally quiet, reticent, guarded, avoiding, introverted, passive, self-derogatory, anxious, tense, nervous, and afraid” (Snyder, 2001, p. 150).

Stuttering and Discrimination

In 1983, it was found that 85% of employers in a study felt stuttering decreased a person’s employability and opportunities for promotion (Hurst & Cooper, 1983). While that was many years ago and times have since changed, are employers today still biased towards hiring and later promoting a person who stutters? The current Americans with Disabilities Act and Employee Assistance Programs expect that workplace policies should indicate awareness of the fact that many workers with disabilities possess talents and skills that can improve the workplace (Chima, 2002). This does not mean, however, that all workplaces hold such policies. In recent years, there has been a lack of research on the experiences and extent to which workplace discrimination is taking place against people who stutter (Mitchell, McMahon & McKee, 2005).

Some clinicians felt that labeling someone as a stutterer would make them feel as though their behavior was linked to their self-identity (Dietrich, Jensen & Williams, 2001). Other clinicians felt that calling someone a stutterer would desensitize them to the disorder and would in turn aid them in treatment. Most clinicians and authors stick to the person-first/disability-second rule, but it was unknown as to whether stuttering falls into the same category as other disabilities that follow that rule (Dietrich, Jensen & Williams, 2001). If listening participants are told that one sample or set of samples are from “stutterers” and the other sample or samples are from “people who stutter,” would there be a difference in how negatively the samples would be rated?

The article *Person-First Labeling and Stuttering* by St. Louis (1998) suggested that there is no significant difference when someone is labeled a “stutterer” or a “person who stutters” (St. Louis, 1998). It is thought, however, that these differences in labeling could have different effects depending upon the person they are used for and the situation in which the person is stuttering. Also, it is controversial as to which label

Speech-Language Pathologists should use when providing therapy to someone who stutters. In the St. Louis study, several participants were used, including clients, parents, students, and the general public. Participants were given two questionnaires in which they rated people with disorders when person-first labeling was used and then when direct labeling was used.

Many limitations and problems are inherent in this study. The title of the study indicated the article would be focused on stuttering, but that was not so. Twelve labels were examined, many of which did not pertain to stuttering, such as “murderer”, “leper”, and “bed wetter” (St. Louis, 1998). When looking at the effect of person-first labeling in communication disorders, it seems unnecessary to compare other labels that are not related.

Also, the participant groups could be biased since 90 of them were either graduate students learning about stuttering, clients who do stutter, or parents of people who stutter. These participants may have different sensitivities to the idea of person-first versus direct labeling and also may be familiar with current standards set by the American Speech-Language-Hearing Association (ASHA). According to this article, ASHA has a policy entitled “People First, Please” which emphasizes the need for person-first labeling, especially in therapy, and is against direct labeling (St. Louis, 1998). Clearly, even though this study said that there was no difference between using person-first and direct labeling, there was still controversy as to which was more appropriate in reducing negative attitudes towards people who stutter.

In past research, some commonly used trait pairs for listener’s perception of people who stutter included: “low intelligence/high intelligence, low self esteem/high self esteem, indecisive/highly decisive, unreliable/highly reliable, emotionally stable/emotionally unstable, socially maladjusted/socially well adjusted, extremely relaxed/highly stressed, unemployable/highly employable, and unambitious/highly ambitious” (Williams & Dietrich, 1996). Interestingly, in a study done by Williams and Dietrich in 1996, people who stutter were viewed as highly intelligent, decisive, and ambitious. On the negative side, people who stutter were also viewed to have low self-esteem and social adjustment along with high tension (Williams & Dietrich, 1996). The validity of this study’s findings comes into question though because results changed across different locations from New Hampshire to Florida. The raters in New Hampshire rated the individual as better adjusted and more employable than did the raters in Florida.

When people who stutter allow these negative feelings and thoughts to overcome them, their stutter can be labeled as a disability if it begins to limit their ability to communicate (Guitar, 2006). Further, a person

is determined to have a handicap if their disability puts limitations on the person's fulfillment of life (Guitar, 2006). In one study of 232 people who stutter, it was found that if two equally qualified people apply for a job, one who stutters and one who does not, 80% agreed, and only 8% disagreed, that the employer will judge the non-stuttering person more favorably (Klein & Hood, 2004). Clearly, the majority of people who stutter feel that they are inferior to those who do not stutter.

Past research has shown that individuals who stutter were viewed as possessing significantly lower self-esteem and social adjustment than individuals who do not (Allard & Williams, 2007). However, if listeners knew that the person who stutters was currently receiving or had received therapy, the person who stutters would be rated more positively. Simply knowing that the person who stutters is trying to get help raises the attitudes toward them (Gabel, 2006). People who stutter were also perceived more positively if they disclosed that they had a stutter either at the beginning or end of a monologue (Healey, Gabel, Daniels & Kawai, 2007). It has been found in one study that as a speech sample was simulated to have either no stuttering, a low amount of stuttering, or a high amount of stuttering, the ratings of the listeners became more negative as the stuttering increased (Susca & Healey, 2001). This shows that the severity of stuttering does play a role in listener perceptions.

In the present study, participants were asked to listen to an audio recording of a person who stuttered and a person who had fluent speech. The other option was to use audio-visual recordings. In the study *Listener Perceptions of Stuttering Across Two Presentation Modes: A Quantitative and Qualitative Approach* it was found, however, that there was little difference between using audio only and audio-visual recordings when assessing negative versus positive attitudes towards stuttering (Panico, Healey, Brouwer, & Susca, 2005). It also was found that if a person spoke with a mild stutter, listeners looked past the stutter and still recognized the speaker's confidence and competence. When listeners heard someone with a more severe stutter, they generated more negative responses to the confidence and competence of that speaker. A major limitation of the study by Panico, Healey, Brouwer, and Susca was that the stuttering samples contained a simulated stutter and not a natural stutter. Therefore, it is unknown if participants would have the same results if they listened to a sample of a person with a real stutter.

Workplace Discrimination

In the workplace, it is unfair if discrimination occurs towards a person who stutters even if they have the same qualifications as other candidates. Promotions in a workplace should be based on education, character,

and qualification, not on social acceptability. However, this is not always the case though, and those with proper qualifications who stutter can be overlooked. With workplace education, employers can be skilled in looking for the correct qualities of a candidate and look past disabilities such as stuttering. These education programs cannot be developed until research shows that these discriminations do in fact take place.

Since males have been found to be more discriminatory towards people who stutter, especially in the workplace (Williams & Dietrich, 1996; Dietrich, Jensen & Williams, 2001; Hergenrather & Rhodes, 2007), this demonstrates that additional education directed at males should be given. If everyone, not just men in the workplace, is educated on various disabilities including speech disorders such as stuttering, people may be more understanding and reduce their negative attitudes. People who stutter have the same rights as everyone else and deserve to be employed in a workplace that does not discriminate against them or make them feel uncomfortable.

Klein and Hood (2004) found that people who stutter believed that stuttering was a handicap in the workplace. Participants in this study were adults who stutter and they were rated on their belief of how much stuttering affected their employment opportunities and job performance. The study found that 71% of people who stutter felt that their stutter decreased results of them being hired for a job, while 70% felt that their stuttering also interfered with promotion opportunities (Klein & Hood, 2004).

In comparison of males and females, it was found that females were less likely to believe that their stuttering would have a negative effect on employability and job performance, and they also felt that they would not do better at their job if they did not stutter (Klein & Hood, 2004). This confirmed that males rated themselves more negatively because of their stutter. So will the same effect take place when males with typical speech listen to people who stutter? Along with gender differences, there were also cultural differences when people who stutter rated their employability and job performance. In this study, approximately 82% of non-Caucasian people (e.g., African Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Native Americans) viewed their stuttering as more of a problem in the workplace than did Caucasians (Klein & Hood, 2004).

A major problem in this study was that most of the participants were well educated with higher status jobs than average. It would have been more beneficial to have participants from a wide variety of educational backgrounds and current job statuses, because the current data was not representative of other populations. Also, while it was stated that the importance of this study was to help clinicians when working with people who

stutter, this goal was not clearly defined or tested. Information was given about what past researchers have found in regards to clinicians helping people who stutter, but it did not clearly say how this study can aid in this goal.

Hypotheses

- If someone who stutters was being chosen for a high-status job, they would receive negative feedback and be less likely picked for the job.

For example, if listeners were given a sample of a highly qualified “stutterer” who was looking to be chosen as a company’s CEO and they were given another sample of a slightly less qualified person with normal speech, it would be expected that the listeners would more likely pick the slightly less qualified person. When looking at why the listeners chose this candidate, it would be expected that this person would have received more positive feedback and the “stutterer” would have received negative feedback in terms of personality, intellect, and likeability.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Participants

For the current study, two hundred four participants were used from a small liberal arts college in the Midwest of the United States. These participants were recruited from Introduction to Psychology classes and were either required to take part in a certain number of research studies or were given extra credit for participating. Given that there are more female students attending this college than males, it was expected that more female participants would respond than male (59% female, 35% male, .5% transgender, 5.5% missing). All participants were treated in accordance with the American Psychological Association ethical guidelines.

Materials and Measures

Audio. Two audio samples of credentials of presidential candidates were played; one containing speech of someone who stuttered and one containing speech of someone with normal fluency. Both audio samples were of the exact same presidential credentials passage, word for word. Both samples contained male speakers that were brothers and had similar voices; the stuttering was simulated by the stuttering speaker.

Demographics Form. Each participant was asked to fill out a demographics form in order to obtain additional information about the participant. This form requested information about the participant’s age, estimated year of graduation, gender, cultural ethnicity, and whether or not the participant knew or was someone who stuttered.

The 25-item Semantic Differential Scale. This measure was developed by Woods and Williams (1976)

and was used to measure the attitudes of participants when listening to people who stutter (Gabel, 2006). The scale consists of 25 adjectives on a bi-polar Likert-type scale, with items such as “Nervous-Calm”, “Tense-Relaxed”, “Aggressive-Passive”, and “Intelligent-Dull”. The scale was measured with seven intervals including “Very much”, “Quite a bit”, “Slightly”, and “Neutral”. Participants completed the scale after each audio sample was presented, so the scale was completed a total of two times for each participant. This measure was found to be overall reliable and was an easy test to administer to participants (Woods & Williams, 1976).

Procedure

Participants took part in this study by accessing an online survey made available to them through the Sona-Systems website for Introduction to Psychology students. The participants each received the internet link to the survey and were able to access it at any time. Before taking the survey, a short informational passage about the study was given but did not include the hypothesis. After a short explanation of the procedure, the students were presented with a letter of consent and asked to complete an anonymous demographics form. Upon completion of all demographics forms and letters of consent, the survey was given. Participants were asked to listen to the audio sample of a candidate with normal speech and then were prompted to fill out the survey. This same procedure was repeated for the audio sample of a candidate with stuttered speech. The orders of the audio samples were not counterbalanced because there was only one large participant group. At the end of the survey, the participants were thanked for their participation and were given the researcher’s email for if they would like to be informed of the results of the study upon completion.

RESULTS

Through generating data through the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), the hypothesis was supported as expected that if someone who stutters was being evaluated for a high-status job, the person who stutters would receive negative feedback and be less likely picked for the job.

For each trait pair the Semantic Differential Scale was used. In this ranking, a score of 1=very much for the first trait, 2=quite a bit for the first trait, 3=slightly for the first trait, 4=neutral, 5=slightly for the second trait, 6=quite a bit for the second trait, and 7=very much for the second trait. A paired samples T-test performed with each trait pair for fluent and stuttering speakers found that 22 of the 25 trait pair items yielded significant differences between the speakers, which are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 along with all outcomes

from the fluent and stuttering speakers based on the 25-item Semantic Differential Scale. These 22 significant trait pairs demonstrate that the hypothesis was ultimately supported; the stuttering speaker received more negative trait scores.

The three most significant trait pairings were Nervous-Calm ($t(203)=26.507, p < .05$) with the stuttering speaker being more nervous, Tense-Relaxed ($t(203)=20.085, p < .05$) with the stuttering speaker being more tense, and Anxious-Composed ($t(203)=19.566, p < .05$) with the stuttering speaker being more anxious. It was interesting to find that these three significant pairings had extremely skewed data; the fluent speaker was rated exceptionally positively and the stuttering speaker was rated exceptionally negatively, skewing the data as seen in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Anxious-composed ratings from listeners for the stuttering and fluent speakers.

One pair, Inflexible-Flexible, was found to not be statistically significant ($t(203)=.476, p < .05$) meaning that listeners found the fluent and stuttering speakers neutral in these traits. There were also two trait pair results that were reversed of what was expected (the fluent speaker was rated more negatively than the stuttering speaker), Friendly-Unfriendly ($t(203)=2.310, p < .05$) and Sensitive-Insensitive ($t(203)=3.389, p < .05$).

DISCUSSION

The purpose of the present study was to determine if a person who stutters would actually receive

negative feedback and be less likely to be picked for a job over a person who does not stutter. In all but three of the trait pairs, the stuttering speaker was viewed more negatively by listeners than the fluent speaker. The three most significant trait pairs (Nervous-Calm, Tense-Relaxed, and Anxious-Composed) had extremely skewed data emphasizing that the stuttering speaker was perceived more negatively than the fluent speaker. Being that both of the speakers read the same passage of presidential credentials, it is obvious that the stuttering speaker was solely judged negatively based on his stutter. Similar findings have been found in past research, such as by Klein & Hood (2004) when people who stutter said that they had personally been discriminated against in the common workplace because of their stuttering. Also, in agreement with the study done by Williams & Dietrich (1996), those who have a communication disorder (stuttering in the present study) are viewed negatively by listeners.

While the results of the present study were largely significant, other factors hold possible explanations for the results. The participants fell in the direction that was expected, so it is assumed that participants did answer honestly for the most part since the results followed the experimenter's predictions. Also, the use of a stimulated stuttering sample may have led to different results than if a genuine stuttering sample was used. Since both the fluent and stuttering samples read the exact same passage, it would be believed that the simulated sample gave the same effect as a genuine sample would have.

Future research related to this topic might look at workplace discrimination with both males and females. Only male audio samples were used in the present study, and different results may occur if female fluent and stuttering samples were also heard. Additionally, it would be beneficial to do a similar study using another type of communication disorder (articulation or voice disorders) instead of stuttering. This would improve potential education on communication disorders being provided for workplaces, since many people have a variety of communication disorders other than stuttering. It also may be helpful to have more cultural and gender differences in the participation sample. The present study had mostly Caucasian females; therefore different cultures and males may have different views of people with communication disorders that the participants in the present study had.

Research on discrimination and perception of speech disorders is necessary in order for people who stutter to be provided with the best possible therapy and support. While it is known that people who stutter certainly have negative feelings about themselves and have these feelings instilled in them further by others,

Speech-Language Pathologists must know more in order to provide efficient and effective therapy. Speech-Language Pathologists may help the person who stutters overcome their emotional problems and they must know the root and extent of these problems. Communication is essential in the workplace, and if the person who stutters cannot communicate effectively, problems could arise. Speech-Language Pathologists should make sure to give focus on communication effectiveness so that the client may properly communicate in the workplace (Susca & Healey, 2002). If there was more research available about discrimination and perception of speech disorders, the Speech-Language Pathologist would have a better understanding and perspective of how to give the best therapy possible.

In the present study, it was remarkable that the person who stutters was rated negatively by listeners. This confirms the belief that education in the workplace is needed for both employers and employees. Because both of the audio sample candidates had the same credentials, there should be no reason that the fluent speaker was viewed more positively than the stuttering speaker. If employers and employees were educated on various communication disorders and how they have no impact on workers' abilities in the workplace, such discrimination may be eliminated and prevented

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Beyond the Western Economic Paradigm: Exploration in Indigenous Capacity Building in the African Context

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This paper argues that a broader conception of human flourishing that honors the socio-culturally embedded heritage of a region may be a more appropriate blueprint for the African region. Arguing that the very idea of development is often rooted in a euro-centric vision of what is appropriate for Africa, the paper proposes the use of development phenomena that fits the African region. Such appreciative inquiries would serve as basis for generating and leveraging locally embedded knowledge within the African context that, as supposed to pure Western conception of development, could provide a much more viable basis for human flourishing in Africa.

Key Words: Structural Adjustment Plan, Non-Traditional Agricultural Exports, Economic Development, Debt, Globalization

According to the World Bank, all countries in sub-Saharan Africa are either developing or underdeveloped; on average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (the value of a nation's productivity divided by the country's population in a given year) in Africa is about US\$2000. The challenge of economic growth is therefore huge, and the situation gets worse all the time especially as a result of rapid population increase, Western exploitation, among many others. So critics wonder if a utopian vision of Africa is attainable for a continent that has spent centuries wearing the emblem of economic failure in the eyes of the world.

One of the biggest problems Africa faces today is over-reliance on rich Western countries for development ideas and financial support, plunging Africa further into ignorance, debt crisis, and poverty. Data from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) indicate that the African continent spends US\$40 million a day paying old debts to rich countries; an amount that adds up to US\$14.6 billion a year and superior to the budget of the entire continent on health care and education. Such a heavy debt repayment, among many others, dwindles severely Africa's financial resources, leaving very little for support of basic services needed to pave the way for self-sufficiency. What is worse, many African countries cannot generate enough revenue from taxation as a result of low tax-paying population, low productivity, and inefficient tax-collecting mechanisms. In this event of rising expenditure vis-a-vis inadequate revenues, therefore, Africans usually have no other choice than to continue borrowing from these foreign sources.

The Establishment of Western Institution

Before most African countries gained independence, the fairly standard development objectives and approaches that were set had often been backed by African indigenous creativity and semi-capitalist development concepts. Even though such pre-independence growth and development phenomena led to significant practical outcomes in many African countries, as Western institutions came into the African scene in the late 1950s, Western ideology was imposed as basis for sustained development. This led to a number of Western theories which were developed for reasons, namely, that the basis for earlier conception of development few decades earlier had not maximized Africa's full potential. These theories were:

- (1) that economic development would be attained automatically once the Western system is set in place for rising employment, rising production, and higher earnings;
- (2) that most African countries would democratize and once they do, the system of revenue generation would be in order and that revenues generated would be used to enhance the productivity of workers;
- (3) that where gaps exist as a result of capital shortage, Western aid would flow automatically to fill in, generating further capital.

The IMF and the World Bank were the two major players in Africa on the West's behalf. In several countries in sub-Saharan Africa, they introduced what they referred to as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), intended to contain debt crisis. The effects of the SAPs were actually widespread, because they prompted strict anti-inflationary monetary policies, privatization of public enterprises, and, in some cases, elimination of subsidies (Stiglitz 2006). These institutions induced farmers to forgo their traditional crops for the so-called Non-Traditional Agricultural Exports (NTAEs), such as cacao and cotton (with Ghana and Burkina Faso leading the way respectively). The World Bank especially promised both trade and financial support over the years. Campaigns were conducted in several poor African countries for massive increase in production of NTAEs with the hope that farmers that export NTAEs would be eligible for tariff-free exports and other tax exemptions.

With the introduction of SAP in Burkina Faso, for instance, farmers dropped their domestic crops such as millet and sorghum for export-oriented crops, such as cotton. Initially, as the World Bank had promised, cotton received considerable amount of funding, and consequently Burkina Faso became the largest producer of cotton in sub-Saharan Africa. Farmers who initially hesitated began to forgo their traditional crops sooner than later in favor of cotton and other cash crops. Cotton farming alone became the employer of about 700,000 farmers—about 17% of Burkina Faso's population. The success was, indeed, reflected in the country's GDP for the first years, as the GDP rose significantly.

How the Western Institutions Failed Africa

Most SAPs and multilateral lending to Africa, besides their knee-jerk reactions to privatization, deregulation, and trade liberalization, however, failed to spur Africa's economic growth. Assessing the prospects of these programs, the UN declared in 1999 that "70 countries [including several African countries], all aid recipients, are now poorer than they were in 1980. An incredible 43 were worse off than in 1970. Chaos, slaughter, poverty and ruin stalked third world states, irrespective of how much

foreign assistance they received" (qtd in. The Washington Post). To strengthen this claim, the UN also reported that the per capita income comparison between the United States (the most productive nation in the world) and that of the entire African continent is about 55 to 1. In view of these figures, it is obvious that Western institutions have failed to fulfill the duties for which they have assigned themselves: to reduce the development gap between underdeveloped countries and the developed ones.

But, are such failures unexpected or planned? Economists such as Perkins (2004), George (1997), Rowbotham (2007), and Shiva (2005) strongly believe that the Western institutions in Africa deliberately engage in strategies that promote the prosperity of their powerful contributors at the expense of Africa. These economists reviewed several development policies imposed by these Western institutions and identified a number of key issues. These issues include:

- (1) introduction of numerous projects on a scale too small to be assessed and adequately supervised;
- (2) difficulties in carrying out projects that require foreign expertise and raw materials;
- (3) revenue allocations and project rankings not based on the people's project priorities;
- (4) difficulty in getting funds for locally-designed projects that require local expertise.

Thus, these observers insist that these Western institutions are established to make profits, and their mission in Africa would not be any different. In Africa, the IMF and the World Bank especially have created policies of intervention, and to enforce such policies experts are appointed who would play huge roles in designing and manipulating economic policies (Danaher 2004, 7). In his book, "Confessions of An Economic Hit Man," John Perkins, a former World Bank representative in Africa, confesses that his "job as an Economic Hit Man (EHM) was to convince third world countries to accept enormous loans for infrastructure development, loans that were much larger than needed and to guarantee that the development projects were contracted to US corporations like Halliburton and Bechtel" (Perkins 2004, 248). Perkins also claims that once poor countries are saddled with huge debts, Western governments and their institutions would control these economies and

ensure that oil and other resources are channeled to serve the interests of building the West's global empires.

Moreover, every decade or so, the IMF and the World Bank decide to help the bottom poorest countries pay off their debts by offering them more loans. As well, as evidenced in his book "50 Years is Enough," Kevin Danaher declares, "third world leaders are told [by Western financial institutions] that, in order to get more loans to pay off the old loans, they must [again] implement 'Structural Adjustment' reforms, a program designed to reduce consumption and to redirect resources to manufacturing exports for the repayment of debt" (Danaher 2004, 20). Thus, these "rescue loans" that come with interests, requirements, and sacrifices plunge poor African countries further into debts. In 1980, Africa's external debt was \$115 billion, an amount that has, and probably would, never be fully repaid. But poor nations always bear the full consequence while the so-called IMF and World Bank economists sitting in plush offices in Western nations are insulated from their own actions (Stiglitz 2006).

Furthermore, policies of these Western institutions often tend to be contradictory and irregular. While African countries are forced to accept loans often at unfair interest rates to build their agricultural sector, Western countries shower enormous subsidies to their own, forcing down world prices and undermining living standards in African countries (Stiglitz 2006, 16). To make things worse, Western governments often impose higher import levies on goods from poor countries in general and sub-Saharan African countries in particular. There is no explanation for such behavior on the part of the West except for greed. Several Western economists even believe that it is impossible for both poor and rich countries to benefit in a competitive world economy. But Stiglitz disagrees; the 2001 Nobel Prize winner in economics insists that developed countries can reframe international trade in a way that it benefits both themselves and developing countries. Africa, he insists, has only become a pawn in the West's power play.

To cite the case of cotton farming in Burkina Faso, its success after a SAP was short-lived because real producer price dropped at the time when cotton price was soaring in the world market. For example, during the early 1980s


cotton producers in Burkina Faso were receiving between 60 and 70 Central African Francs (CFAF) per kilogram of seed cotton, while the world cotton price ranged between 200 CFAF and 250 CFAF (Baffes 2007). Most farmers who devoted their lives to cotton farming ended up with agricultural wages insufficient to even support their families. Also, the deteriorating terms of trade inhibited the acquisition of relevant inputs needed for maintenance. Several farmers, in their desperate attempts to secure their farms, borrowed from their neighbors what they subsequently could not reimburse, drowning them further into debts.

To emphasize the depth of the desperation, the village of Gaoua, which consisted mostly of cotton farmers, counted three cases of suicide following what was called the "cotton depression." Rowbotham (2007) argues that unlike in medicine where if patients die repeatedly at the hands of a doctor, the doctor goes out of business, in economics, since causality is almost impossible to establish given the complexity of factors, economists such as those at the IMF and the World Bank continue to enjoy unblemished reputations and astronomical salaries despite the failure of their policies, even by their own admissions (Stiglitz 2006).

As well, exchange rate devaluations of some African economies, encouraged usually by Western experts, also call for attention. The depreciation in the real exchange rate is relevant in some cases in encouraging farmers to shift from traditional crop production to exportable cash crops. But first, devaluation, as the name suggests, reduces the value of a local currency vis-à-vis other foreign currencies; this automatically raises the amount of foreign-exchange denominated loans to be paid to foreign institutions. Second, several IMF and World Bank projects require foreign machinery and capital to implement, so devaluation automatically raises the cost of importing such capital. Third, small-scale traders who have been the back-bone of Africa's service sector since time immemorial find it extremely difficult to borrow local currencies to import goods from around the world. All these negative impacts of devaluation favor the Western world at the expense of these African economies.

The devaluation of the CFAF in 1994 and the subsequent appreciation of the euro a few years

later took their toll on the cotton industry in Burkina Faso. Even though real producer price of cotton did not rise significantly during those subsequent years, “the ginning companies that sell at world prices incurred sizable financial losses. The largest, SOFITEX, which is partially government owned, incurred losses amounting to more than 1 percent of GDP” (Yartey 2008). So, even though cotton farmers struggled, the ginning companies (that also employ a significant proportion of Burkina Faso’s labor force) were hit even harder because they sold cotton products in the world market at prices that were lower than they had paid to cotton farmers. The following table depicts the difference in world market price of cotton and real producer between 1996 and 2000. In the mid 2004, for instance, the farmers received CFAF 210 per kilogram seed cotton, while the ginning companies sold at world market price of CFAF 150.



Yet, on several occasions observers have wondered why several Asian economies are developing rapidly (especially their agricultural sectors) while African countries are terribly lagging behind. But the reason is not hard to find: whereas African countries have failed to ignore policy prescriptions of the IMF and World Bank to unnecessarily liberalize their trade regimes, countries such as Singapore and Malaysia have been re-thinking their options, and indeed stubborn in opening up their markets to foreign competition. Such policies have freed

the Asians to nurture those sectors that constitute the back-bone of their national economies where necessary, and to process raw harvests where needed, in order to make their exports competitive on foreign markets.

Lastly, it is no secret that cases where poor African countries make successful loan repayments and on time, Western institutions usually underrate such efforts. Sometimes such feats are simply disregarded, if not loathed. In Ethiopia, a loan from the IMF (at a very high interest rate) to purchase an aircraft was agreed on by the government. Since the need prevailed, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi agreed to the unfavorable terms. And despite the high interest rate, Zenawi implemented a vigorous economic plan that expunged the loan faster than the IMF had expected, or rather, had wanted. With no extended time to reach maturity, the loan had simply failed to accumulate the anticipated interest (Stiglitz 2002). As a result, the IMF was unhappy, and tried to discredit Zenawi’s government with non-relevant evidence (Stiglitz 2006). Stiglitz, who was then the Chief Economist at the World Bank, has since claimed in several interviews that plans were put in place by the IMF to destabilize the Ethiopian economy. He remains agnostic, however, as to whether such a disgraceful act was of deliberate intention or just a show of arrogance on the part of the IMF. Either way, it was unethical and it made several observers question the Western countries’ mission in Africa.

“Odious Debt” and Africa’s Underdevelopment

African politics has been dominated since the early 1960s by totalitarianisms and dictatorships. Beginning with the assumption that most African leaders are greedy political opportunists just as Western institutions in Africa are poverty profiteers, most African leaders implement policies primarily for political expediency.

But, most urban workers in Africa, such as businessmen and industrialists, are better educated and therefore put a lot of pressure on bad governments. The majority of them naturally have no faith in bad governments, given that such governments usually overthrow democratically-elected governments that everyone assumes would submit to the needs of

the people. For such reason, bad governments in Africa usually lose their legitimacy.

To gain support, bad governments do interfere in urban markets, shifting privileges from the well-informed citizens to the relatively uneducated and weaker citizens. Such government interventions also generate funds for distribution to the poor as political patronage. They forge alliance with some working class, religious, and ethnic groups, take care of their immediate economic needs, and curb any grievances they might have against the government. To organized labor, several illegal privileges are restored. To college students, college loans that are otherwise payable after graduation are written-off. To influential state workers, salaries are raised astronomically. When such a system exists, long-term development planning becomes relatively unimportant compared with the immediate political and economic interests of ruling governments.

But where do illegitimate governments get such "redistribution" money from? The phrase "Odious Debt" was coined by the legal scholar Alexander Sack to refer to debts that are issued to a bad government in a country in order to subjugate and to colonize the country's citizens. Patricia Adams, in her book, "Odious Debts," provides plenty of research evidence to prove the terrible nature of loans made by Western institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. Such loans, she claims, have had several unwarranted consequences leading to the strengthening of military regimes, destruction of environment, shabby capitalism, and loosed lending systems that fuel government corruption in underdeveloped countries. She therefore calls for what she refers to as "Odious Debt Proceedings" in relation to debts made by the IMF and the World Bank to third world governments, especially illegitimate governments and corrupt dictators. Her measures, where implemented, have been effective in bringing about transparency and accountability (Majot 1994).

But, staffed with technocrats who make the rules and dictate terms in their favor, Western institutions have created power bases through which they succeed in issuing loans to corrupt governments and brutal dictators, without bothering to question these governments' true democratic principles (Halon 1998). It is

disheartening that the Western institutions that profess to be friends of African countries lack the moral obligation to stand up to the principles they preach. According to a United Nations report, conditions in Zaire continued to deteriorate at the time when president Mobutu was looting hundreds of millions of dollars into his personal coffers. Considered the world's most corrupt leader at the time, Mobutu's fortune was estimated to be more than \$10 billion dollars, not including many secret mansions he owned in Europe and other parts of the world (Halon 1998).

After examining the sordid and pernicious nature of corruption in Zaire, for instance, Erwin Blumenthal, a senior IMF official, wrote a report to the IMF revealing the problem, but no serious action was taken. So he resigned. As Halon (1998) describes the situation, "when Blumenthal wrote his report [to the IMF], Zaire's debt was \$5 billion; by the time Mobutu was overthrown in 1998 the debt was over \$13 billion. In the six years after Blumenthal's report, the IMF lent Zaire \$600 million and the World Bank \$650 million" (Majot 1994). Such is a typical example of "Odious Debts," where regimes such as Mobutu's are favored as they are a strategically of influential powers to the Western world.

True, the support for dictatorial regimes in Africa by Western financial groups has helped propel bad governance, worsening poverty situations. But, more often than not, only African leaders are held responsible by the rest of the world. To illustrate, Barclays Bank has for years helped bankroll President Robert Mugabe's disastrous regime in Zimbabwe, by providing millions of pounds in support of Mugabe's vilified land reforms (Barnett 2007). Barclays is the most high-profile of three British-based financial institutions, and has provided more than \$1 billion in direct and indirect funding to President Mugabe's administration (Barnett 2007). According to *Influential Newsletter Africa Confidential*, "the British organizations [financial institutions] provide an economic lifeline keeping Mugabe's regime afloat" (qtd in. Barnett 2007). Even though Mugabe's opponents describe the banks' activities as a "disgrace" and an "insult" to the millions who suffer human rights abuses and live under horrible conditions, these institutions have turned a deaf ear to such reactions.

A New African Development Paradigm

1. *Pre-Colonial Creativity and Abundance*

During the pre-colonial times, Africa had an economic system free from debt burdens and unfair trade policies; the system also provided an economic security that its populace was pretty much contented with. Africans were mainly involved in simple activities such as farming, animal husbandry, fishing, and artisanship (pottery works and mining). Goods produced from these activities were exchanged in local markets, without any fear of foreign competition. Banking and investment, though in a very basic form, existed even before the “Europeans” arrived. The “family pot” banking system, for instance, was a system where accumulated funds contributed by all were used for the welfare of communities. Communities contributed financial resources to cover the costs of activities such as funerals, weddings, festivities, educational expenses of gifted children, and start-up businesses (Ayittey 1992).

The main form of banking, called “Susu” in Ghana, involved contributions from several people into a huge fund. After every three months or so, the entire amount was handed over to the members in turn. To be operational, such a “loan club” required a liberal dose of trust among members. In fact, for many businesses in the indigenous and informal sectors of several African countries today, the “loan club” is the primary source of capital (Ayittey 1992). Thus, in most African cultures, given the nature of their collective lifestyles, there is a social premium on reciprocity and helping each other for mutual benefits (Sachs 1992). It is not even about the bottom line and profit at any cost without regard to who is affected.

In addition to such innate attitude is the abundance of tremendous natural resources, such as gold, diamond, oil, timber, salt, cattle, poultry, forest, and sea. Indeed, if wealth is defined as the possession of resources that can generate income, then Africa is in a position to prosper tremendously.

Such community-based development efforts cannot, of course, sustain a country in this age of globalization. But why couldn't Africans build on such intelligence and creativity? Was it colonial brainwash?

Ayittey (1994) realizes that the influence that the West has had on African minds is so powerful that most African scholars denigrate indigenous African institutions and capacity building. African colleges today are full of textbooks and course outlines that are full of Western concepts. Africans at every level of their education are bombarded with Western ideological superiority. Almost all fields of study— medicine, technology, economics, government, sociology— promote the superiority of Western capitalism and cultural influence. African educators teach and lavish praises on Western concepts, theories, and practices in ways that make most Africans feel inferior about their indigenous capabilities. Thus, today most young Africans believe that Western concepts are the benchmarks against which the appropriateness of all development ideas can be measured.

Some African observers plead the post-colonialist argument that the aftermath of slavery and colonization has caused the development problems in the post-colonialist era. Such a belief, they insist, is exactly what causes the Western world to be inherently pessimistic about development prospects of Africa; it is also what encourages the West to take advantage and impose economic policies on Africa based on an overrated sense of Africans' inferior intelligence.

There is no question that Western influence is an inevitable force in today's Africa, but Africans should be the force in their own development. So if sub-Saharan Africa is still lagging behind after several decades of independence, then there must exist a structural deficiency within Africans' mentality that deter them from being the force needed in their nations' development.

2. *Some Indigenous Scholars' Perspectives*

The following are a few of Africa's own scholars who have contributed valuable and fascinating ideas for Africa's development.

Joseph Ki Zerbo

Born in Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta), Professor Joseph Ki Zerbo is definitely one of the African thinkers whose writings in development in the African context have been inspirational. Educated through the French school system, but dedicated to sustaining African traditions and systems, Ki Zerbo made waves with his notion of “Self Made

Development” (Badini 2000). Ki Zerbo argues that “thinking for oneself” is the basis for all authentic human actions and has special validity for Africa. Thus, instead of always consulting IMF and World Bank bureaucrats, it would be wise for African governments to look internally and to bring together their own businessmen and enterprising leaders to generate incentives for prosperity. The principle of self-sufficiency incites African students and researchers to believe that they are capable of thinking and innovating, and competing with the rest of the world.

Andrew Mwenda

Andrew Mwenda, an African journalist who earned his postgraduate degree in the United Kingdom, believes that western aid is obstructive to African development. He is a contemporary African scholar whose keen awareness of poverty issues, reinforced by his commitment to his country, Uganda, and the entire African continent makes his ideas worth adapting. Mwenda corroborates Ki Zerbo’s principle when he affirms during his speech at the Technology, Entertainment, Design (TED) conference in June 2007 that, “no one became rich by receiving charity, nor a country developed due to the generosity or the kindness of another.” In other words, only self-reliance will result in true and sustainable development. Simply put, foreign aid is an inappropriate weapon to use in fighting poverty. With the abundance in Africa, progress will be attained if its rulers trust and implement their indigenous capacities.

Hassan Zaoual is a Moroccan professor of economics at L’université du Littoral Côte d’Opal in France. Founder of the North-South Network Culture and Development, and director of a journal series *Economie Plurielle, L’harmattan, Paris*, Zaoual has involved actively in raising awareness of the African cultures and perspectives to international institutions. He states the following:

“Contrary to the western model, or way of seeing things, the paradigm that emerges from the cosmogonies of the African site would seem to be characterized by relations between human beings than by utilitarian, individual, economic functions... This suggestive maxim help us to understand the [indigenous] African economy as an economy of affection” (qtd. in Bawtree,

Victoria and Majid Rahnema 1996, 34-35).

Dr. George Ayittey

George Ayittey is a prominent Ghanaian economist who teaches at the American University in Washington, DC. With a Ph.D. from the University of Manitoba in Canada, this African scholar, who serves at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, has been an incessant opponent of some foreign aid packages to Africa. According to Dr. Ayittey, “reform of the abominable political and economical system” is mostly what Africa needs, not aid that never reaches those most in need (Ayittey 1992). He adds that since 1960, more than \$600 billion has been transferred into the continent, but the result has, instead, been more poverty. Therefore, Western institutions must abandon their humanitarian impulse of aid and come up with “smart aid” that would subsidize traditional crops, modernize pastoral activities, finance artisan works, and create smaller local banks, such as Grameen Bank in India, for the poor.

3. Providing the Basic Necessity for Indigenous Growth

No country ever develops without the basic economic foundation. A solid economic foundation can be built by first taking care of public, economic, and social services. Public services consist of items such as public administration, law enforcement, and efficient military system. These “amenities” constitute the primary foundations of any country in establishing an adequate and secure government and in enforcing the rules of the state. In Africa, expenditures on public services were higher during the early 1960s when several African countries had recently gained independence, constituting on average 7% of GDP and about 25% of entire governments’ expenditure (World Bank 1995). Compared to these earlier periods, however, public expenditure as percentage of GDP has fallen for several African countries during the last 25 years.

Government spending on social services should include mainly spending on health care, basic education, and other social needs. As is the case in several African countries, the private sector is not developed enough to take care of these, so the government always provides them. Because there is strong correlation between a

countries' quality of health and education on one hand and productivity on the other, these services have become nothing but public goods. Beyond basic provision by the government, however, anything beyond is left to the government and private sectors—tertiary education, for instance, becomes more of a luxury than a necessity for a typical agrarian economy, until the economy reaches certain level of development.

Across board, as regards to social services, education should receive the largest proportion of financial assistance, and it should reflect in the provision of basic school supplies, child nutrition, and teachers' earnings. In Botswana, for instance, expenditure on social services has remained high and fairly constant for several decades and that explains for the most part the steady growth of Botswana's economy.

Education, especially basic education leads to what economists refer to as "positive externalities." Thus educated individuals behave and respond to situations in ways that benefit the entire economy—such behaviors as voting the right individuals into political offices. And more important, education plays a huge role in lowering fertility among women and enhancing women's knowledge of health and nutrition. Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen argues that adequate provision of free basic education and health care is a prerequisite for economic development (Sen 2005). Sen finds it hypocritical, though, that several of the industrialized countries that provided subsidized health care and education for their populations in their early years of development are now preaching the mantra of privatization of these basic services to their so-called less developed counterparts.

4. Solutions for Debt Crisis

First, countries experiencing severe cases of poverty should have their debts cancelled, especially if such debts were incurred during dictatorial regimes. However, such a decision must not be left to the World Bank and the IMF because, as incompetent as they are, their approach to debt cancellation might lead to other growth problems. The best way to go about this is to create an international mediation committee that would determine a bias-free debt cancellation procedure.

Already-incurred "Odious Debts" should be dealt with in the same manner, while the IMF and the World Bank are warned against knowingly issuing "Odious" loans. Recalcitrant dictators must be put to justice accordingly by the International Court of Justice, so in the future innocent citizens would not bear the consequence of greedy, semi-educated, and power-hungry individuals. As Stiglitz (2006) asserts, help for the very poor should not come at the expense of the poor; debt relief should not be a tool for holding countries to ransom, or for undermining their democratic institutions. Debt relief should provide a fresh start (Stiglitz 2006, 234).

Second, new loans should absolutely be targeted to projects that tap into indigenous skills and knowledge, and must be given at low interest rates. Project loans that come with pre-conditions, restrictions, and high interest rates should absolutely be rejected. Yet these loan packages are presented so nicely that several third world countries fail to recognize the consequences. Financial institutions send their representatives over to wine and dine with third world government officials while they (the representatives) sell loan packages. They give nationwide presentations, using technical economic terms, as to why it is a good time to borrow, why their particular package is particularly attractive, and why it is the right time to restructure debt (Stiglitz 2006, 216). African leaders must recognize these traps and deal with them appropriately.

Third, the SAPs were just invented to reinterpret loan terms of greedy Western institutions, and make these terms look less severe. The SAPs are full of Western ideas and they do very little, if any, good to these African economies; they must be abolished. The SAPs are used by the IMF and the World Bank to set guidelines borrowers must follow, and when these guidelines lead to failure, these same institutions refuse to accept responsibility. It is time Africans consider themselves masters of their needs and decisions.

Conclusion

The causes of Africa's poverty have little to do with lack of resources and natural intelligence necessary for economic prosperity. That is why the development of Africa should be better left to those who have personal interest in its economic success, rather than to those who are in to pursue profit. The best interests of African

nations are served by foreign investment strategies designed to enhance rather than exploit its economic potential.

As discussed, the Western institutions' SAPs have never paved the way for Africa's economic progress and have, in most cases, hindered previous growth processes. Privatization and trade liberalization have been vigorously pursued, but the indigenous economic as well as cultural environment are yet to be incorporated into these processes to promote efficient use of factors of production and technologies. Taking "short-cuts" with Western concepts will hardly, if ever, bring any glimmers of hope to Africans.

But, while the adaption of African indigenous capacity is a necessary condition for Africa's development, this alone is not a sufficient condition for eliminating severe cases of poverty. Democracy, accountability, a process of national dialogue (where different parties voice their opinions), and implementation of widely-accepted policies are needed.

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Paternalism, Industrial Democracy, and Unionization in the Cleveland Garment Industry: 1900-1935: The Case of the Printz-Biederman and Joseph and Feiss Companies

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Two models used to avoid unionization efforts associated with the bilateral monopoly collective bargaining model in the Cleveland garment industry during the latter Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century were Frederick Taylor's "Scientific management," employed by the Joseph and Feiss Company and John Leitch's "Industrial Democracy," utilized by the Printz-Biederman Company. At the Printz-Biederman Company, a maker of upscale women's garments, Industrial Democracy provided a collaborative decision-making body for the workers and featured a Cabinet of officers of the company, a Senate of managerial level employees, and a House of Representatives elected directly by fellow workers. At the Joseph and Feiss Company, a manufacturer of men's wear, Scientific management, with its focus on time and motion studies and paternalism, became the model for establishment of wages, shorter work weeks, increased production, provision of health care, and the granting of equal opportunity for advancement to women. Ultimately, however, neither Scientific management nor Industrial Democracy were sufficiently robust to resist the pressures of aggressive labor unions during the Depression of the early 1930's.

Key words: Industrial Democracy; Taylorism; Scientific Management; Cleveland Garment Industry; Printz-Biederman Company; Joseph and Feiss Company; International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU); Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA).

INTRODUCTION

During the latter part of the Nineteenth Century and early part of the Twentieth Century, four movements converged in Cleveland, Ohio that had a significant impact on the city's development as one of the principal garment manufacturing centers of the United States. Those movements were: (1) evolution of the United States garment industry into a significant industrial force; (2) the popularity of "Taylorism" or "Scientific management" after the ideas of Frederick Winslow Taylor; (3) the development of an "Industrial Democracy" movement in the relationship of labor and management; and (4) growth of the unionization movement in the United States.

How the convergence of the four movements affected labor-management relations in the Cleveland garment industry in the early part of the Twentieth Century is examined here. Specific focus is placed on the evolution of labor-management relations at two companies which used significantly different

approaches to their relationships with employees. The use of scientific management and a relatively paternalistic model of labor-management relations was followed by Joseph and Feiss and the Industrial Democracy model was adopted at the Printz-Biederman Company.

The study presented here examines these experiments in labor-management relations as alternatives to the more traditional collective bargaining approach. Collective bargaining typically involves some degree of adversarial relations and countervailing power in a bilateral monopoly environment where the outcome of, for example, wage negotiations initially is indeterminate and dependent on the negotiating skills of the two bargaining parties of labor and management (McConnell, Brue, & McPherson, 2006). The evolution of the Printz-Biederman and Joseph and Feiss labor relations regimes into a standard union-management adversarial model in the 1930s provides insights into both the challenges firms that desire to remain nonunion confront and into the

attractiveness to workers of the traditional collective bargaining model.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The garment industry in Cleveland developed in the last half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to become one of the city's leading industries. For nearly a half century over 10,000 Cleveland workers, accounting for 7% of the city's work force, were employed in the garment industry. By the 1920s, Cleveland was a close second to New York as a leading center for garment production in the United States (Garfinkel).

National labor unions, including the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), founded in 1900, and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA), founded in 1914, both of which were originally part of the American Federation of Labor, were aggressive in the first quarter of the twentieth century in trying to organize workers in the Cleveland garment industry. The ACWA tried organizing the Joseph and Feiss Company in the World War I era and the ILGWU was aggressive in trying to organize the Printz-Biederman Company resulting in a bitter strike in 1904. Later, in 1911, five thousand workers at 33 Cleveland firms, under ILGWU leadership, went on strike over union recognition issues (ILGWU).

The theories of Frederick W. Taylor (1911), often referred to as "Taylorism" or "Scientific management," held that increased production efficiency could be obtained by replacing the judgment of individual workers with rules, laws, and mathematical formulas developed by managers. One of the main tools Taylor advocated was that management employ time-and-motion studies which involved the careful timing and recording of the actions taken to perform a particular task. As noted by Jones, George, & Hill (2000) the fundamental objective of Taylorism was to improve efficiency by finding ways to improve each worker's ability to perform a particular task.

According to Garfinkel, the threat of unionization and the influence of "Scientific Management" caused the Joseph and Feiss Company to integrate "Scientific Management" with a form of paternalism. In order to have a form of control over the workers, keep turnover rates low, and allow them to work at high levels of efficiency, Joseph and Feiss managers closely supervised the actions of their

employees. In return, the company provided benefits including recreational activities for its employees by having hour long "recesses" where males and females were split up into different sports and having employees share in a bonuses program and opportunities for advancement (Haake, 1921).

Another way firms dealt with the threat of unionization was to embrace the concept of Industrial Democracy which was described and advocated by the labor theorist John Leitch (1919) and adopted by the Printz-Biederman Company. Industrial Democracy was the organizing of a factory into a little democratic state with representative government having both legislative and executive components. A "Cabinet" would consist of the executive officers of the company. A "Senate" would be a non-elected body of the lower-level executives, department heads, and foremen; i.e., all those who have authority over the workers. The "House of Representatives" would be the popular body of the government elected by all the workers. Wage adjustments, for example, would first be considered by the House of Representatives, then the Senate, and then passed to the Cabinet for final approval. The objective was to achieve justice in the work place which, according to Leitch, encompassed cooperation, economy, energy, and service or, what he called the "Square Deal."

The question raised here is, why did the bilateral monopoly bargaining model prove to be more robust and more consistent with worker interests than the Scientific Management/Paternalistic model, referred to as the Industrial Psychology model by Alfred Haake (1921), and the Industrial Democracy model? For nearly two decades these labor relations models appeared to address the needs of their constituencies. However, the pressures of the Great Depression and labor unions led to abandonment of these two experiments and ushered in a new era of traditional bilateral bargaining at both companies. The pedagogical approach we follow to examine this question is a descriptive analysis of the labor relations in the Cleveland garment industry in the early 20th Century, particularly at the Printz-Biederman and Joseph and Feiss firms.

GARMENT INDUSTRY LABOR ORGANIZING PRE WORLD WAR I

The approaches to labor relations that evolved in the Cleveland garment industry through both Industrial Democracy and paternalism occurred in the aftermath of significant labor strife in the needle trades in 1909, 1910 and 1911. Strikes by garment workers in New York, Chicago, and Cleveland established an environment that emboldened workers but at the same time caused employers in the garment industry to seek alternative labor relations models to what was experienced in the 1909 to 1911 period.

Shirtwaist makers were involved in a New York City strike often referred to as the "Uprising of the 20,000" in November 1909 ("Facing Starvation," 1909; "Girl Strikers," 1909). Most of the strikers (actually closer to 30,000) were women garment workers who ultimately did win some concessions from garment industry firms including a reduction in the work week to 53 hours ("Shirtwaist Girls," 1910). However, Schofield (1984) notes that in large part the strike was not successful because the ILGWU called off the strike on February 13, 1910, when most of the New York Industry was operating at full capacity in spite of the strike.

In the summer of 1910, nearly 60,000 members of the ILGWU, and Shirtwaist Makers Union struck the firms belonging to the New York Cloak, Suit, and Shirt Manufacturers' Protective Association (Levey, 1960). This strike resulted in the Protocol of Peace which was the first collective agreement in the garment industry. The Protocol called for a wage settlement and assurance that hiring would be on a preferential basis for union members (Scharf, 1984).

Following the strikes in New York, 40,000 garment workers struck Chicago men's garment firms for four and a half months beginning September 22, 1910 (Weiler, 1984).

The Chicago strike, which was over wages related to piece rates, marked the start for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA) and also showcased the organizational talents of its leader, Sidney Hillman, the first president of the ACWA.

The Hart, Schaffner, and Marx Company became one of the first firms to settle with workers when they signed what was, one of the most comprehensive bargaining agreements in the clothing industry at the time ("Chicago Garment Workers' Strike"). Further, by 1915,

the majority of Hart, Schaffner, and Marx employees became members of the ACWA, the union whose founding was an outgrowth of the Chicago strike.

THE CLEVELAND 1911 GARMENT WORKERS STRIKE

On June 6, 1911, 4,000 garment workers struck Cleveland garment manufacturers to improve working conditions. Worker demands included: a 50 hour work week with Saturday afternoons and Sundays off; that no more than two hours of overtime per day be allowed; double pay for overtime; there be no charges for use of machines, silk or cotton; and a closed shop ("Strike to Go On," 1911). The employers rejected all of the workers' requests ("The Garment Workers Strike of 1911").

The Cleveland Cloak Manufacturers Association, including The John Anisfield Company, The H. Black Company, The Cohen Goodman Company, The Greenhut Cloak Company, The Printz-Biederman Company, Schwarz, Huebschman & Forney, M.T. Silver & Company, and The Sunshine Cloak and Shirt Company, ran an advertisement in the June 10, 1911, *Cleveland Plain Dealer* refuting charges that sweatshop conditions existed in the Cleveland garment shops. The Cleveland manufacturers claimed they had led the movement for better conditions in the industry including 54 hours per week working hours and Saturdays as half-holidays. The manufacturers also noted that Cleveland wages on a yearly basis were better than any other city, including New York. They stated Cleveland workers were kept busy nine to eleven months per year whereas New York workers had employment for only six months per year.

The 1911 strike in Cleveland was characterized by considerable violence. *Cleveland Plain Dealer* articles on June 10, June 11, June 13, June 28, July 20, July 25, and August 17, 1911, described riots and other acts of violence associated with the strike including the death of a worker and the shooting of an 11 year old girl whose father was a garment company guard. As the strike entered a fourth month in September, the workers were asked by secret ballot whether they wanted to continue the strike. On September 11, 1911, by a ratio of 27 to 1, workers voted to continue the strike. However, the manufacturers claimed they had beaten the strike by using strikebreakers, some of whom came in from New York, and that

output for the season was running at 60 to 90 percent of prior years ("Strike to Go On," 1911).

The Cleveland Garment Workers strike of 1911 ended, at best, in disappointment for the workers. The ILGWU convention on October 15th noted that union rules placed a limit on how long a strike could be funded and that after nineteen weeks the Cleveland workers had exceeded the limit. On October 21st, 1911, without taking a vote, for all practical purposes the Cleveland garment workers strike came to an end. Although the ILGWU never officially called the strike off, officers of the union advised strikers to use their discretion about returning to work ("No Decision," 1911; "Strike Ended," 1911). Other than a few workers who worked for small independent shops that had settled early in the strike, the garment workers went back to the factories without any of their demands being fulfilled (Christman, 1992).

One of the interesting dimensions of the Cleveland Garment Workers Strike of 1911 was the role of women—a topic explored in some depth by Scharf (1984) and Christman (1992). About a third of the striking garment workers in Cleveland were women who were employed in 33 shops of varying size. During the strike, women were highly visible and took their place alongside the men on picket lines and in demonstrations (Scharf, 1984).

The 1911 strike in Cleveland was considered a failure by many historians. Christman (1992), however, concludes its lasting legacy is evident in the role that women played in the strike. Specifically, Christman concludes that the strikers, male and female, achieved victories that are perhaps less tangible than union recognition and pay increases. Those victories included the development of a fighting spirit among the workers. That fighting spirit could be evidenced in both the men and women and especially in the commitment made by women to the ideals of the strike.

The Cleveland Garment Workers Strike of 1911, in spite of its apparent failure, apparently alerted at least some Cleveland garment firms to the pressures developing within the labor movement. Here we examine how two Cleveland firms, one in the women's cloak and suit business, The Printz-Biederman Company, and one in the men's suit business, The Joseph and Feiss Company, responded in unique but quite different ways to the evolving labor environment.

COMPANY PROFILES:

THE PRINTZ-BIEDERMAN COMPANY

The Printz-Biederman Company was founded in 1893 by Moritz Printz, a native of Austria who had been head designer of the women's cloak manufacturer D. Black & Company, his sons Michael and Alexander, and his son-in-law Joseph Biederman. The original location of the firm was in a loft at 102 St. Clair Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio. Originally called Printz-Biederman & Company, the firm later changed its name to The Printz-Biederman Company (Printz-Biederman Co., 1933).

As it expanded, the company moved to larger facilities on St. Clair Avenue and then in 1904 to the corner of Lakeside Avenue and West 6th Street. In 1934, Printz-Biederman took a long-term lease on and renovated a building owned by what was then known as the Case School of Applied Science at 1800-1900 East 61st Street in Cleveland. At the time, the firm employed over 1,000 men and women ("Observes 41st Birthday," 1934). In addition to the Cleveland plant, a branch factory was operated in Lorain, Ohio (Printz-Biederman Co., 1933).

In 1954 control passed from the Printz family when Max Reiter took over the company. Reiter had been co-founder of Ritmore Sportswear Company until 1953 when his partner, Maurice Saltzman, bought him out and the firm became Bobbie Brooks, Inc. At the time of Reiter's purchase of Printz-Biederman, the company had 1000 employees and annual sales of \$8 million. Business declined during the 1960s and 1970s and when Printz-Biederman closed in 1978 it employed only 40 Cleveland workers (Printz-Biederman Co., *Encyclopedia of Cleveland History*).

THE JOSEPH AND FEISS COMPANY

The Joseph and Feiss Company began as a small general store, Koch and Loeb, in Meadville, Pennsylvania. In 1845 founder Kaufman Koch moved the store to 82 Superior Street in Cleveland, Ohio, and sold a general line of men's and boys' clothing (Berman & Harrison, 1977). Over the course of the next six decades, the company changed names and partners a number of times, yet continued to produce men's garments. After numerous name changes, the company stabilized as Joseph and Feiss in 1907, under the leadership of Isaac and Moritz Joseph and Julius Feiss (Berman & Harrison, 1977).

The business was moved to a new location in Cleveland at 2149 West 53rd Street in 1920, the year when the company formally adopted the "Clothcraft" brand name. Under the Clothcraft name, the Joseph and Feiss Company generated a steady base of sales by introducing a low priced attractive men's product, the \$15 blue serge suit ("Joseph and Feiss").

In 1966, the Joseph and Feiss Company merged with the Phillips-Van Heusen Corp. at which time it employed close to 1,200 workers (Hoven, 2007). Because of this merger, the Joseph and Feiss Company produced under the Cricketeer and Country Britches label and expanded its line by producing women's clothing in the 1980's. ("Joseph and Feiss").

In 1989, the Joseph and Feiss Company was acquired by the West German company, Hugo Boss AG, in a deal worth close to \$150 million ("Company News," 1989). In 1997, the Joseph and Feiss Company, along with nearly 450 employees, moved from their West 53rd Street location to their distribution center on Tiedeman Road in Brooklyn, Ohio ("Joseph and Feiss"). At present, the company still produces suits, sports coats, and slacks under the Hugo Boss brand.

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND PATERNALISM: STRUCTURE AND GOALS

Printz-Biederman and Joseph and Feiss, although in different segments of the garment industry, were similar in that they were both closely held and managed family owned, entrepreneurial firms. While the two garment firms sought to avoid union organization of their

work force, they took quite different approaches to deal with that challenge.

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PRINTZ-BIEDERMAN COMPANY

In 1914, John Leitch sold his ideas on Industrial Democracy to the Printz-Biederman Company (Carpenter, 1921). Either the Senate or the House could initiate any measure it wished. When a measure was passed by one house, it went to the other for approval, rejection, or amendment. If there were amendments, a conference committee considered the issue and made a recommendation to both houses. The Cabinet retained the right to veto the measure, but five years after adoption of the Industrial Democracy model of labor-management relations, Alexander Printz was able to boast that the veto had never been exercised (Printz, 1919).

SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT, PATERNALISM, AND THE JOSEPH AND FEISS COMPANY

When Richard A. Feiss became Vice President in 1905, the Joseph and Feiss Company changed its organizational structure and manufacturing operations. Richard Feiss, a devotee of the theories of scientific management and a president of the Taylor Society, set out to demonstrate how to apply Taylor's theories to the seasonal and changeable clothing industry (Goldberg, 1992).

Although the implementation of scientific management was later, the company's initial efforts to use the system brought about numerous problems. In 1909, Joseph and Feiss suffered one of the earliest walkouts involving scientific management; workers protested wage cuts and work rules (Goldberg, 1992). Although this walkout was quickly resolved, it was understood that the firm would have to change their system of scientific management.

Feiss understood that along with scientific management, welfare practices (paternalism) must be adopted to make the workforce more productive. To ensure that welfare practices were an integral part of the new management philosophy, Feiss created the Employment and Service Department in 1913 and hired Mary Barnett Gilson, a graduate from Wellesley College, and a fellow pioneer of the

scientific management field, to head the department (Goldberg, 1992).

The Industrial Democracy and Scientific Management/Industrial Psychology models, therefore, represented distinctly different methods of handling labor-management relations. The Printz-Biederman Industrial Democracy structure dealt primarily with the day-to-day issues workers and management confronted in the plant. The Joseph and Feiss Scientific Management/Industrial Psychology structure was designed to manage not only the work place environment but the general life-styles of the workers as well.

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND PATERNALISM: IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS

Although the Industrial Democracy and Scientific Management/Industrial Psychology experiments lasted about 20 years, there were problems implementing and administering the two programs. Likewise, the issue of union organizing attempts never completely disappeared as the Cleveland garment industry confronted periodic episodes of labor strife.

At Printz-Biederman Senate operations became problematic relatively early in the company's experience with Industrial Democracy. In a May 11, 1915 message to the Senate, its Chairman, I. K. Heller, reported Senate work had been carried on with difficulty. Heller stated that lack of attendance and interest in Senate meetings by department heads shirking their Senate responsibilities was impeding the work of the Senate and company. In November 1918, the Senate was replaced by a Planning Board consisting of six members (Carpenter, 1921). The Planning Board consisted of six management personnel from several departments (Printz, 1919).

John Leitch, the originator of the Industrial Democracy idea, was made an honorary member of the Printz-Biederman House of Representatives. At the October 22, 1914 meeting of The House, Leitch made a plea to the members to be leaders of the workers but to be prepared to take criticism for their actions as well. Building on the four cornerstones of Justice, Energy, Economy, and Service, Leitch told the House that they will build steadier work, better wages, and better business for the whole institution.

The issue of unionization of the workers became obvious in remarks by both Leitch and company president, Alexander Printz, at November 1914 meetings of the House. Leitch believed strikes could be avoided if conditions were made so good that the workers would not want to go on strike (House Minutes, November 31, 1914).

In addressing the House on November 22, 1914, Alexander Printz claimed ILGWU representatives were saying the company's Industrial Democracy plan was an attempt of the management to deceive the workers. Printz stressed the importance of the House gaining the confidence of the workers to make their plan work. Specifically, he stated that the Industrial Democracy organization was a method by which representatives of the workers could reach company officials and that anything of a square deal nature will get square deal consideration. His views on the union were clear in the following statement:

Just bear in mind that we want to run our affairs and shall run this organization without any outside influence whatever (House Minutes, November 25, 1914).

Printz also recommended the creation of a Betterment Committee of members of the House and Senate to handle suggestions and complaints of the workers. The Betterment Committee could then take those issues up with the Cabinet. At Printz's suggestion, a Betterment Committee was formed consisting of three Senators and three Representatives (House Minutes, November 25, 1914). The Betterment Committee became an institution that remained in existence for about twenty years when it was replaced by a union collective bargaining agreement.

Another committee created by the House was the Wage-Rate Committee consisting of one member from each of the large factory departments and one member representing the company. Its functions were to recommend and pass upon general changes in wages, set standards for wage ranges in the various operations based on skill, length of service, and attendance, sit with the Planning Board to pass on individual increases, hear complaints of workers, review cases referred by superintendents, and recommend changes in operations and positions (Printz, 1919).

A major issue that arose in 1915 was a recommendation initiated by the cutters that the work week be reduced from 49 $\frac{3}{4}$ to 48 hours. The request, which resulted in the formation of a 48 Hour Week Committee, received considerable attention by the House, according to its May 20, 1915 and June 10, 1915 minutes, and was adopted that summer. On June 1, 1915, the 48 Hour Week Committee laid out a set of rules that would eliminate shirking and make the 48 hour week a workable concept (Leitch, 1919).

In promoting the virtues of his Industrial Democracy concept, Leitch illustrated an incident that occurred in 1915 that demonstrated the commitment of the company and its employees to the Industrial Democracy experiment. In September 1915, the ILGWU decided to unionize Cleveland and to start with Printz-Biederman. The employees heard of the ILGWU's plan through the newspapers. The Senate and House then passed a resolution that was ratified by a mass meeting of the employees (Leitch, 1919). The resolution included the following:

Resolved that we, the employees of The Printz Biederman Company, hereby express our strong disapproval of the action taken by an outside organization as shown in the proposed demand referred to in [a] newspaper article, and be it further received that we tender to our Company our most earnest and sincere support for the present most fair methods of conducting the business. If we knew any stronger language of expressing our full satisfaction we would use it.

According to Leitch, the ILGWU organizers left town that night. They did not present any demands to the management (Leitch, 1919). However, the ILGWU had not given up on Cleveland and the next several years proved to be a major challenge for Leitch's concept of Industrial Democracy.

The ILGWU called a general strike against the Cleveland garment manufacturers on July 23, 1918 ("Two Strikes," 1918). The union demanded union recognition and a wage increase.

In response to inflationary pressures during World War I, the management of Printz-Biederman introduced a complex high-cost-of-living bonus system. The amount of this bonus

was to vary from month to month based on a price index published by the Bradstreet organization. The bonus was put into a separate envelope so that employees would not confuse it with their regular pay. This was separate from a production bonus system, which paid a bonus for production in excess of a bonus. However, the cost-of-living bonus complicated workers' understanding of the pay system and caused them to request the bonus be converted into a wage increase (Carpenter, 1921). Subsequently, on July 30, 1918, the company's Wage Rate Committee offered a plan for revision of the bonus system ("The Wage Rate Committee," 1919). The proposal to the House was that a 12 percent wage increase be instituted instead of the high-cost-of-living bonus. The House agreed and accompanied this bill with a statement of intent to ask for wage increases from time to time to correspond to the rate of inflation (Carpenter, 1921).

During this period, though, the ILGWU was active in Cleveland and exploited the confusion of Printz-Biederman employees over the bonus system by criticizing the Industrial Democracy system. The House held a discussion on the situation and reminded management of the problem the rising cost of living posed for workers and their families. It also was pointed out to management that wages in the garment industry in New York were higher than in Cleveland. The management counter argument was that the industry in New York was seasonal and that with the cooperation of the employees in the Industrial Democracy system and careful planning, seasonal unemployment had been avoided. Over the year, management argued that the employees made more money than their New York counterparts because unemployment was avoided (Carpenter, 1921).

The result of these deliberations in the House was the issuing of a statement listing the achievements of the Industrial Democracy system including the reducing of working hours to 48 hours per week and achieving four wage increases in two years. The House statement then included the following:

By threatening to call a strike without our approval you are trying to change our conditions which we repeat are entirely satisfactory. Certainly, if your union is sincere in the claim that it is trying to assist the workers, it can prove it by leaving us alone (Printz, 1919).

The workers backed up their statement by staying on the job while most of the 39 garment factories in Cleveland had to curtail operations because of the strike. At Printz-Biederman, all but seven of 950 employees remained at work (Printz, 1919).

The Cleveland garment workers strike was settled on August 12, 1918, through the arbitration efforts of Newton D. Baker, a former Cleveland mayor who was then United States Secretary of War ("Arbitration of Strike," 1918). Baker requested both sides to submit reports to a board of three referees because the large Cleveland firms were involved in making garments for the war effort and he did not want a prolonged work stoppage. The referees met with union and management including a representative from Printz-Biederman at Hanover, New Hampshire. The decision of the referees was to be known as the Hanover Decision and involved a wage increase, established the principle of collective bargaining in the Cleveland garment industry, applied the general principles of the War Labor Board which recognized the workers' right to organize and announced that piece rates were to be settled by the employers ("The International Ladies' Garment Workers Union," 2008).

The Printz-Biederman representative at the meeting was given instructions to request that its plant be excluded from the arbitration. Although the Printz-Biederman Company was not originally awarded exclusion, the House appealed and obtained a written statement that the plant was not included (Printz, 1919).

The issue of the 1918 strike became a problem for Printz-Biederman even though only a very small number of workers walked off the job. Following the strike, the House expelled the union sympathizers and the company discharged them. As a result, the company was brought before the War Labor Board on charges of discriminating against trade unionists. The company had a narrow escape when its defense was accepted that the workers were dismissed for disloyalty to the existing organization of the shop and not for their trade union activities.

Another issue with which the company had to contend was renewed attacks by the union on the concept of Industrial Democracy and the bonus system. The union claimed the company used the bonus system as a speed up tool that would lead to premature old age and shortened lives for the workers. To investigate this accusation, the House and management engaged a physiologist from Johns Hopkins

University who determined that the accusations were without merit (Carpenter, 1921).

During this period the bonus system continued to be a source of tension and the Wage Rate Committee decided to work with the Planning Board to devise a more satisfactory bonus system. After some deliberation, the Wage Rate Committee and management agreed on a bonus system that had two levels—a production bonus and a year of continuous service bonus. That system was effective July 23, 1919 (Carpenter, 1921).

The union persisted in pressuring Printz-Biederman in 1920. In a March 29, 1920 letter to the House by M. Perlstein, Manager of the Cleveland Ladies Garment Workers' Union, the union pointed out it had reached a treaty of peace with the Cleveland Garment Manufacturers' Association and that Printz-Biederman was the only company not part of the agreement. Perlstein suggested that the House meet with representatives of the union to have a discussion to "work out relations based on sound principles whereby capital and labor should really begin to understand each other [and] work together for the mutual benefit." Perlstein went on to accuse the House and the company of being selfish and trying to profit from being isolated. The House responded with a letter to Perlstein stating the Printz-Biederman collective bargaining arrangement was satisfactory, that working conditions and earnings at the company had constantly improved and asked that the ILGWU not try again to organize the company's workers (Perlstein, 1920).

Although there is an absence of detailed information on labor relations at the company during the 1920s, wording in the employment contracts that its employees had to sign during the 1920s suggests the company was striving to preclude any union activity. The company's "Contract of Employment" read in part:

Since both parties to this Contract believe that the Constitution of the House of Representatives, its By-Laws and Working Rules provide ample means for adjusting any differences that may arise between them, they agree that neither has nor will make any contract that will interfere with the operation of the Constitution, said By-Laws or working Rules or any

employment contract... (*Contract of Employment*).

Traditional collective bargaining between unions and management typically results in a contract. Therefore, the wording in this Printz-Biederman "Contract of Employment" could be interpreted as putting an employee who attempts to institute a union contract in violation of his or her employment agreement with the company.

Printz-Biederman appears to have faced continual pressure from the ILGWU as it experimented with Industrial Democracy. By contrast, for a period of time, the implementation of the Scientific Management/Industrial Psychology model at Joseph and Feiss during the second decade of the twentieth century appears to have been pressured by fewer outside forces.

In 1916, a study was conducted to examine the role scientific management had on Joseph and Feiss between 1910 and 1915. The study concluded the overall cost of production had decreased, as had the turnover rates in the company's labor force. Between 1910 and 1914, the percentage of labor turnovers at Joseph and Feiss had dramatically decreased from 150.3% to 33.5% ("Anti-Time Study Legislation," 1916). Lay-off rates became progressively lower by using scientific management, and by standardizing the style of men's suits so that there was a constant demand. Correspondingly, standardizing the style of the suit cut down on the costs of production, allowed for direct sales (instead of taking orders), and also allowed for a year-round market (Commons, 1920).

Once the ideas of scientific management were known to the employees and implemented, the management applied a piece-rate work system with bonuses to further encourage efficiency in the workplace. According to the article, "Scientific management in Action" (1921), during an employee's first week, wages started at \$.35 an hour. The lower wage, known as a "retainer," was applied to cover the production that would be lost due to job training. The second week's wages would increase to \$.45 an hour and the maximum standard rate during the early 1920's was \$.55.

In addition, the \$.55 per hour wage could increase through bonuses by completing quality work and reaching the production goals. Both bonuses were an additional 15 percent of the hourly wage (a total of a 30 percent bonus in

addition to the \$.55 wage). Another \$.50 could be added daily for regular attendance. In total, an employee could earn up to \$.715 an hour, or \$6.72 per day, including the attendance bonus (*Scientific Management in Action*, 1921).

The company continually updated its employees on the goals of scientific management in order to keep the company one of the most efficient clothing shops in the region. In a memo to all foremen and apprentices, a tentative outline of "What a Clothcraft Guide Ought to Know" (1921), was issued, and included sections on the general policies of scientific management, labor policies, and manufacturing organizations. These policies included Joseph and Feiss becoming one of the firms to establish the five-day work week in 1917. In an article in *The New York Times*, Richard Feiss described four of the advantages of running a five-day work week. These advantages included: saving power; reducing absenteeism and labor turnover; gaining new sources of labor (due to the 5 day week), and having a more balanced production with definite quotas ("Ford's 5-Day Week," 1922).

Alongside scientific management, Joseph and Feiss also understood that welfare practices, or paternalism, must be utilized to make the workplace more efficient. Under the practices of paternalism, employees worked under conditions that encouraged greater collaboration and a higher morale.

All matters of employee welfare were handled by Mary Gilson, head of the Employment and Service Department (known in short as the Service Department). The Service Department was in charge of all hiring and firing matters which differed from prevailing practice at other companies which often left such matters in the hands of foremen or supervisors. Absentee or tardy employees were personally investigated by the Service Department and the investigations would sometimes be carried on in the home. All other matters including recreation, libraries, and sanitary conditions were also taken care of by the Service Department (*The Clothcraft Shops*).

In its report for 1914, the Service Department stated its personal standards for workers. Those standards noted that truly efficient persons would prefer a "clean, healthy body and plain, businesslike clothes to untidiness, powder, jewelry...and other evidence of false ideals." However, in time the cleanliness standards for workers became the

basis for authoritarian work practices and intrusion into personal matters.

Aside from the sanitation and appearance of workers, the Service Department's 1914 Report also included items beneficial to the workers such as \$.10 boxed lunches for the workers to maintain an affordable and healthy diet. Clean and attractive lunchrooms, large enough to fit the entire workforce at one time, were also available separately for men and women (*The Clothcraft Shops*).

Exercise and games, as pointed out in the report in 1914, were a pivotal part of the work day for the employees. Noon games were conducted such as baseball, tag, crack the whip, cards, and many others. This "play hour" was kept separate for the males and females, and sports teams (such as women's baseball) were often held in high regard.

On Wednesdays at noon, an orchestra would play and a dance was held for the employees. Management believed that an hour a day of exercise and games would only continue to increase the cooperation and team spirit among employees. On Wednesday evenings, all employees were invited to a "party," along with their friends and family. There also was a company choir which would sing at these parties (*Service Department of the Joseph and Feiss Company's Report*, 1914).

Medical services were another priority because the executives believed attendance was vital; therefore, spending more money in this area paid off in having fewer sick days taken by the employees. For example, there was an operating room used jointly by the oculist, physician, and dentist. The oculist and surgeon would spend one day a week at the office and the physician would be at the office two days a week (*The Clothcraft Shops*).

Vacations were also important. For the first week in September, factory work would be suspended, allowing workers to enjoy themselves and become refreshed and ready to work hard again. Corresponding with the paid week of vacation, the Service Department would investigate vacation spots and would then post bulletins advertising and picturing the pleasures of various places (*Clothcraft Shop*).

Among the company's paternalistic activities was the promotion of the use of a company bank, the Penny Savings Bank, which served as an encouragement to thrift (*The Clothcraft Shops*). Along with the Penny Savings Bank, workers enjoyed a pension plan. The pension plan was implemented after an

individual's first year at the company.

Employees were given \$.05 per day that was applied to a pension fund and this amount increased every year up to \$1.50 per day. In total, the maximum amount of money attained at the end of thirty years service with the company was approximately \$8,000 ("Clothing Company Uses," 1928).

In order to encourage education, the company hired five public school teachers to come on Thursdays after work to teach English to foreign employees. The Cleveland Board of Education paid these costs, making sure there would be no additional monetary burdens for the workers (*The Clothcraft Shops*).

Although the control exercised by the executives became "authoritative" in their attempts to improve the workplace, the overall ideas of Paternalism were revolutionary at the time (Goldberg, 1992). Implementing Paternalism in the workplace improved cooperation, morale, and gave the employees a sense of "team spirit," which all helped to improve the quality of product from the Joseph and Feiss Company.

The paternalistic approach to employee relations extended to the treatment of female employees. From its early years, Joseph and Feiss held women employees in relatively high regard. The management found that inequalities in pay led women to become disinterested and dissatisfied with their jobs; as a result, production and the overall morale of the shop would decrease. Instead, "it was recognized that work must be paid for in accordance with the difficulty involved, the skill required, the degree of agreeableness or disagreeableness and the importance" (Commons, 1920).

According to an article by John R. Commons, "Lizzie Likes her Job" (1920), research was conducted to determine fair and proper wages for different types of work. Although the study showed there was still a wage disparity, these salaries were thought to be fair and in accordance with the difficulty of the work. Women found such wages high enough to keep them at the firm, and to maintain a high morale.

Women, like men, were able to attain executive positions as well. The company did not take gender or experience into consideration as much as a college degree. Women with college degrees, consequently, were able to move up the ranks as quickly as men. By 1920, twenty-one of the firm's forty-six supervisors

were women; a remarkable feat for any American industry in that era (Goldberg, 1992).

Although the Industrial Democracy and Scientific Management/Paternalism models differed in their structure and implementation, they both appear to have met with significant employee approval through the early 1920s. Printz-Biederman employees resisted aggressively ILGWU attempts to organize them. The Joseph and Feiss paternalism provided a relatively protected and comfortable work environment for its workers. However, a combination of national economic trends and changing conditions created an environment in the late 1920s and early 1930s that made both firms vulnerable to union organization.

UNION RECOGNITION

Unions representing the needle trades became particularly aggressive in Cleveland in the early 1930s as general economic conditions deteriorated. For example, in early 1933, relations between the ILGWU and Cleveland garment manufacturers were particularly tense. The employers association, which had up until then dealt collectively with the union, disbanded and the employers were not inclined to sign new union agreements ("Garment Union Head," 1933).

David Dubinsky, president of the ILGWU, visited Cleveland on several occasions and alleged sweat-shop conditions existed in the Cleveland plants ("Postpones Strike," 1933). The ILGWU threatened to strike the non-union Cleveland garment firms in 1933 over working conditions, wages, adherence to the closed shop, and the farming-out of work to other shops ("Two Strikes In Cleveland," 1933). After some postponements, the ILGWU voted to have a general strike in January 1934 on the grounds that efforts to secure an agreement with the manufacturers had failed (Lavelle, 1934a). In the end, the strike was called off because an agreement was reached through the arbitration efforts of Newton D. Baker. In the settlement, the manufacturers agreed to a wage increase, absorption of unemployed members of the union, and the closed shop ("Garment Workers Sign," 1934).

It was in this environment of increased tension between the ILGWU and the Cleveland garment manufacturers that Printz-Biederman found itself the target of aggressive organizing attempts by the ILGWU after nearly twenty years

of operations under the Leitch Industrial Democracy model. In July 1934, the cutters at Printz-Biederman joined the ILGWU ("Cutters Join Union," 1934). Then, on August 25, 1934, Abraham Katovsky, Vice President of the ILGWU for the Cleveland area wrote a letter to Alexander Printz requesting that the cutters be paid union wage scales and be given back pay to January 17, 1934 when the scales went into effect. Katovsky also accused the company of deliberately tightening work standards in order to reduce wages and on infringing upon the rights of workers under Section 7A of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) which gave employees the right to organize and bargain collectively.

On September 7, 1934, Printz responded to Katovsky stating the company was living up to its requirements under the NIRA and the Code of the Cloak and Suit Industry which had been enacted under the law. On the matter of a tightening of standards, Printz stated the piece-rates being paid were based on time studies ratified by collective agreement under the Industrial Democracy framework. In a September 28, 1934, letter to the union, Printz pointed out that the company's employees had entered into a collective agreement through the Betterment Committee on July 10, 1934, and were bound by that agreement.

Several months later, on January 25, 1935, a meeting was held between Alexander Printz and Abraham Katovsky to discuss the issues of mutual concern. The minutes of that January 25, 1935, meeting reveal that for the first time Printz began to realize that the fundamental relationships between labor and management were in the process of changing. At one point in the meeting he stated; "The only agreement I will make with you is that when my agreement expires in July [1935], the employees will be free to vote for yours."

Katovsky held that giving the workers the right to vote on joining the union after July 10, 1935, would not work because their minds had been poisoned against the union by the company. What Katovsky wanted from Printz was an agreement that as of July 10, 1935, the union would be the bargaining agent for all workers—whether union or non-union and that the issue of a closed shop be part of a board of arbitration. The first steps toward such an agreement began with a series of meetings between Alexander Printz and David Dubinsky, President of the ILGWU.

Before the meetings with Dubinsky, Printz contacted Frances Perkins, the Roosevelt Administration's Secretary of Labor, to request assistance in resolving major issues between the company and the ILGWU. Perkins assigned A.L. Faulkner, a Department of Labor conciliator, to the case. A strike at Printz-Biederman was averted when Printz and Dubinsky agreed to meet in Washington, D.C., accompanied by Katovsky and Faulkner ("Threatened Strike," 1935).

Following the meeting with Dubinsky, Printz addressed his employees in the morning of February 4, 1935. Printz expressed confidence in the loyalty and sense of justice of the employees. He reviewed for the employees the meetings he had with Katovsky, Dubinsky, and Faulkner in Washington on February 2 and 3, 1935. He then proposed a possible union organization scheme. Printz offered to present a proposition to Dubinsky that the Printz-Biederman Company be given a charter by the AF of L and: "That the president and officers be elected by your votes...and that it have no connection with Mr. Katovsky and his local union." (All of the other ladies garment firms in Cleveland at that time were organized under a single local of the ILGWU.) Printz noted he had no idea whether this plan would be acceptable to Dubinsky. However, he also proposed that the drafting of the plan be put in the hands of Dr. Arthur Rubin of the University of Chicago's Economics Department. He (Printz) was willing to trust Rubin if Dubinsky would do so as well.

Printz recognized that action to avoid a strike was necessary and that he had to give the proposed plan to Dubinsky that day (February 4, 1935). Therefore, he asked the workers to vote on it. In a secret ballot vote, 206 people favored the plan suggested by Printz and only eight were against it.

The meeting with employees adjourned at 12:30 pm on February 4, 1935, and at 1:45 pm that day, Printz telegraphed Dubinsky with the proposal. After a series of telegram exchanges, Dubinsky and Printz agreed to meet in New York on February 6, 1935, along with Dr. Rubin, A.L. Faulkner, and Hugh L. Kerwin, Director of the U.S. Conciliation Service. The result of this meeting included an ILGWU agreement:

to establish in the City of Cleveland a separate local Union to be under the sole supervision of the General Executive Board of the said International Union for the workers employed in the

shops of Printz, Biederman Co. (*Agreement*, 1935).

After nearly a third of a century of trying, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union had organized the workers at the Printz-Biederman Company. In so doing, the Industrial Democracy experiment of 1914 had given way to another, unique at the time, experiment of a separate local of the ILGWU for the Printz-Biederman shops.

Whereas Printz-Biederman had felt pressure from the ILGWU from the early 1900s, under the "open shop" of Joseph and Feiss, pressure from organized labor had been minimal for many years. However, during the 1920s, problems arose within the company and in the management. By 1925, net earnings had plummeted by nearly half. In turn, the Joseph and Feiss Company was unable to pay its preferred dividends for the first time. For these reasons, dissension among the executives regarding the high costs of the Employment and Service department began. Gilson, head of the department, resigned in 1924 after facing severe cuts in the welfare programs and a reduction in her influence. Additionally, Richard Feiss was under attack by the other executives of the company, specifically his father Julius and brother Paul, who argued that scientific management had run its course in the company. He resigned in 1925. Although the Joseph and Feiss Company recovered quickly from these mid-1920s problems, and enjoyed renewed growth with most of its managerial infrastructure and many of its welfare programs intact, the executive reorganization was a blow to the application of scientific management (Goldberg, 1992).

The atmosphere between employee and employer became progressively more hostile and in August of 1933, more than 1,000 Joseph and Feiss and Richmond Brothers (another Cleveland firm) employees were urged to join clothing workers unions ("Urge 1,000," 1933). The union movement at Joseph and Feiss began in earnest in March 1934 when an employee, John Melda, claimed at an Amalgamated Clothing Workers meeting that he was discharged for his union activities. The meeting unanimously voted for a committee to call on the management of Joseph and Feiss to demand the reinstatement of Melda. Further, the ACWA agreed decisive action would be taken if any other workers were fired for union activities ("Says He Was Fired," 1934).

On March 14, the ACWA led the Joseph and Feiss employees on a walkout ("Peaceful Plan," 1934). Among the demands of the 1,800 Joseph and Feiss strikers were a 25 per cent wage increase, recognition of the union, and the reinstatement of Melda (Lavelle, 1934b). Although only lasting a few days, the workers maintained a sturdy picket line while a payroll loss at the rate of \$35,000 weekly was endured ("Garment Strike Near Settlement," 1934).

In its attempts to settle the strike, Joseph and Feiss became one of the first firms to ask the Cleveland Regional Labor Board to step in and help settle the dispute and reach an agreement. With the help of the Labor Board, the drafted proposals included several key provisions that would need to be implemented for the strike to end. As noted in *The Plain Dealer*, the major points of the proposal were that strikers return to work immediately and an election be held to decide who would represent the employees (Lavelle, 1934b).

By March 19, 1934, an agreement had been struck and promptly ended the strike ("Reason Wins," 1934). The strike came to a relatively quick end due to negotiations involving Paul Feiss, Sidney Hillman President of the ACWA, and Ralph Lind, executive secretary of the Cleveland Regional Labor Board. A pivotal part to the agreement was the provision to allow the employees to vote for either a company union or the ACWA to represent them. The vote was taken following the end of the strike on March 19; the results were 1,216 to 402 in favor of ACWA representation ("Union Wins," 1934).

The most significant change at Joseph and Feiss that resulted from the strike and the vote in favor of the ACWA representation was the transition from an open shop to a "preferential" shop. This "preferential" shop required the company to hire and fire workers according to union membership (union members having preferential treatment) ("Union Wins," 1934). To further solidify the agreement, the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* noted a ten percent wage increase to the employees was granted, thus assisting in the maintenance of a harmonious relationship (Lavelle, 1934c).

CONCLUSION

Examined here has been the question of whether the experiments in Industrial Psychology/Paternalism and Industrial Democracy in the Cleveland garment industry in the first third of the 20th century improved

working conditions and the effectiveness of labor-management relations. The cases of two firms were examined. The Printz-Biederman Company adopted the Industrial Democracy model and the Joseph and Feiss Company adopted the Industrial Psychology model. However, both firms had their labor forces organized by unions by 1935. The question can be raised, then, of whether these experiments in Industrial Democracy and Industrial Psychology were a failure or were evolutionary developments that made union organization more acceptable to the workers and management of these firms.

The evidence suggests that the adoption of the Industrial Democracy model was undertaken at the initiative of the Printz-Biederman management. As such, it must be viewed as an attempt by the management to avoid the adversarial labor-management relations usually associated with the bilateral monopoly labor relations model.

In the ordinary adversarial union-management model, labor and management individually and separately prepare their positions prior to negotiations over wages, hours, and working conditions. In the Printz-Biederman case, though, there was what might be called a collaborative decision-making structure in the guise of Industrial Democracy.

Detailed data on wages are not available for the twenty year period that Industrial Democracy was operative at Printz-Biederman. However, the resistance of the work force to attempts by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) to organize employees of the company suggests that there was active support for the institutions of Industrial Democracy at Printz-Biederman for nearly two decades. Therefore, it can be concluded that the fundamental needs and expectations of the workers were being addressed successfully during that time by the implementation of Industrial Democracy.

During the 1930s, in an environment of economic and employment uncertainty, the ILGWU intensified its attempt to organize the Printz-Biederman workers. Those efforts ultimately were successful, but in that success the ILGWU had to accept what was at the time unique for it in bilateral bargaining arrangements; i.e., a separate local for the union at the company. In turn, by acquiescing to this demand, the ILGWU demonstrated flexibility as it recognized worker loyalty to Printz-Biederman

that twenty years of Industrial Democracy had brought to the firm.

The adoption of Paternalism at the Joseph and Feiss Company represented still a third model of labor-management relations compared to the usual union-management adversarial model and the Industrial Democracy model. Joseph and Feiss integrated a form of paternalism, or social welfare, into the company. The adaptations of Taylorism and paternalism were successful in that the company remained free of labor unrest from 1909 until 1934.

During the 1909-1934 period, Joseph and Feiss made advances in areas such as higher wages, shorter work weeks, increasing production, allowing women to advance in the company, and providing health care. However, the company's control over the lives of its employees became somewhat authoritarian; loyalty was demanded, lockers were checked, and visits could be made to the homes of absent workers. These concerns led to the organization of the workforce by the ACWA in 1934. The "authoritative" leadership structure of scientific management and paternalism was changed. The workers had decided that the once revolutionary ideas of Joseph and Feiss would

be replaced by the traditional bilateral monopoly adversarial labor relations model.

Our conclusions, then, are that both the Printz-Biederman Industrial Democracy and the Joseph and Feiss Industrial Psychology/paternalism models served their constituencies adequately for a period of nearly two decades. In time, though, those institutions were not sufficiently robust to resist the allure to workers of the organizing attempts of labor unions. Those pressures were magnified by the exigencies of an economy and industry struggling through the Great Depression of the 1930s. By the mid 1930's, both firms surrendered their experiments in labor-management relations to the prevailing bilateral monopoly adversarial model that had become dominant in the garment industry.

Future research on the topic of labor relations in the Cleveland garment industry might well consider the post 1935 and post World War II role of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America and the International Ladies Garment Workers Union within the Cleveland firms as those firms declined and, in some cases, exited the industry.

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